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NOTRE DAME LAWYER

claims of his creditors would be thereby defeated, since the heir's
wishes are subservient to his obligations.
In line with the minority view is the argument that the judgment
creditor has an uncertain and unsubstantial claim which can be defeated in many ways. The devise can be renounced, as above shown,
or it may be assigned to a third person who would take prior to the
judgment creditor. Cf. Lee v. Lee, 207 Iowa 882, 223 N.W. 888, 890
(1929). The contention of both the dissenting and the concurring
judges, that the creditors lien could be wiped out by a sale of the
property during probate, is weakened by the rule which transfers the
lien from the property to the debtor's interest in the proceeds of the
sale. In re Harris' Estate, 28 Del. Ch. 590, 44 A. (2d) 18, 19-20
(Orphans Ct. 1945). A successful contest must result if the claim is
to be satisfied, and the minority regards this tenuous interest too
uncertain to harass the courts and heirs. The fact that any creditor
can achieve the preferred position of a lien creditor highlights the
basic fear of the minority - increasing the number of will contests.
In re Shepard's Estate, supra.
In the last analysis, the controversy is between the policy favoring
the enforcement of valid claims, and the policy of protecting probate
administration from undue harassment. While it is true that the
manner of paying a debt is optional with the debtor, and the obligation
of taking voluntary steps to put himself in a position to pay is a
strictly moral one which the law does not recognize, it is submitted
that natural justice does not permit a debtor to avoid his debts and
injure his creditors. If he will not contest the will, the judgment
creditor should be given this right, especially in view of the conclusiveness of probate. Without this right, he might be forever prevented from
satisfying his claim. In such cases, the law should not allow considerations of time and convenience to deter it from the objective justice.
Carl F. Eiberger
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How To KEEP OUR LIBERTY: A Program for Political Action. By

Raymond Moley. 1 New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1952. Pp. xxvii,
339. $4.00. - In this interesting and valuable book, Mr. Moley proposes to do something about the disturbed state of our political
weather. Pertinently he says: 2 "Merely to bewail a trend is not to
correct it." The American wants to know what to do about it (viz.,
the preservation of his liberty). The threat to liberty is "Statism,"
1 Contributing
Columbia University.
2

Text at vii.

Editor, Newsweek Magazine; Professor of Public Law,
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which the author interprets to be "the intervention by government in
economic, social and personal life." Statism is thus frankly and logically made the villain of Mr. Moley's piece. Liberty will be safe,
according to the author, when the force of this unlawful and destructive intervention by government is hurled back and permanently
disarmed.
Implicit in this thesis is what Woodrow Wilson said in 1912: "The
history of liberty is a history of limitations of governmental power."
Thus interpreted, liberty can endure only when and where governmental power is strictly limited. Liberty shrinks with the growth of
government and it disappears altogether when the power of government becomes absolute. Those who will object that this conception of
liberty is narrow and negative (and believe me, I know that there
are many in this category) simply must be asked to take or leave the
broad affirmations of the Declaration of Independence upon which
this vicarious reciprocation between liberty and government is based.
Early in his book Mr. Moley footnotes Edward F. Barrett's comment in the Natural Law Institute Proceedings at the University of
Notre Dame. 3 "From that [Natural] Law" writes Mr. Barrett,
"resulted certain basic human rights. These rights the State was
morally competent to implement and protect but not to impair or
destroy." This, which is a substantial paraphrase of the "self-evident
truths" of the Declaration of Independence, puts government in its
orthodox American place. Like fire, government is a helpful servant
but one which constantly threatens to become a dangerous and
destructive master. Like fire, government has to be watched and firmly
contained behind the iron walls of Constitutional limitations.
Spelling out the role of such a government in the field of economics
Mr. Moley says: 4
When individual and co-operative efforts fail and government assumes
regulatory power, its function should be the making of rules generally
prohibiting, not compelling. It is valid for government to tell a man not
to do something against another man; it is not only impracticable but a
denial of liberty to tell him exactly what he should do for another.
The lurking danger in all governmental regulation is like that in press
censorship. The censor will never be content to tell people what not
to print. He ultimately will tell them what to print.
Against this, the libertarian theory of proper governmental action,
the author postulates the "initial assumptions" of Statism, viz., 5
(1) The basic purpose of the state is to supply the individual with
more of the material means of life.
(2) That political power is attained by the promise of those benefits.
(3) That political power is further assured by creating envy and
hatred among social groups - in short, class feeling.
Id. at 6.
4 Id. at 30.
5 Id. at 172.
3
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(4) Since the National Government is to be the source of benefits
the loyalty of the individual must be to that source rather than
to his immediate neighbors and local institutions.

These "initial assumptions" of Statism are now popular American
assumptions. The turnabout from the libertarian fear of government
to the modern worship of the State as a source of welfare, in Mr.
Moley's view, was accomplished by a calculated mixture of practical
politics with the "new look" in education, and socialistic economics.
After World War I cynical materialistic pragmatism surged out of
higher education and infested the grade schools right down to the
kindergarten. Mr. Moley does not say so but the moral is pretty
obvious; naturally worshipful mankind was turned away from the
"impractical" worship of God to the worship of the Welfare State.
Henceforth he could make his own handy and convenient devils out
of the "Economic Royalists," "Wall Street" and the "Special Interests."
The author shows how our government of laws was turned into an
"administration" of benefits, pains and penalties by hordes of "beneficent pro-consuls" sent out from Washington. From his carefully
documented record it is clear that this revolution to Statism cannot
be reversed by mere wishful thinking. To succeed the libertarians
must be just as hard and realistic as the welfare politicians. Contrary
to the myopia of popular impression, the record is the best of all
briefs against the Statists. In the course of its political strangulation
of private business the Federal Government is now violating its own
unfathomable Anti-Trust Laws while its "proliferation of miscellaneous
and hidden subsidies" launches endless means for the new "privileged groups" to live off the earnings of others.
If the reader desires more than the ample documentation of facts
furnished by Mr. Moley let him turn to three other recent books on
the same general subject. "Ten Thousand Commandments," by Harold
Fleming, (Prentice-Hall); "Toil, Taxes and Trouble," by Vivien
Kellems, (E. P. Dutton); "Man to Man," by Bernard Ward, (Caxton Press).
In conclusion, Mr. Moley warns us that "the vote is the pay-off."
Liberty cannot be saved by a mere scoring of debaters points. The
voters must first be convinced and then induced to kill Statism at the
polls. "How To Keep Our Liberty" analyzes the electorate from many
interesting and novel points of view and proposes a definite plan of
action. The millions who have ruefully asked themselves "what can
I do about it" and then proceeded to do nothing at all, should read
Mr. Moley's book from beginning to end.
Clarence E. Manion*

*

Former Dean, College of Law, University of Notre Dame.
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NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 1950. Vol. IV. Edited by
Edward F. Barrett.1 Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1951. Pp. 144. $2.00. - These are the five papers delivered at
the fourth annual convocation of the Natural Law Institute of the
College of Law, Notre Dame University. They mark a milestone in the
growing influence of this fine adventure in sound public education.
Already there are evidences over the nation that this revival of the
principles of Natural Law is finding wider and wider acceptance. There
is no more wholesome sign in our present perplexed and troubled time.
Three of the authors of these papers are notable lawyers - Thomas
J. Brogan, once Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey;
Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Chief Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; and Reverend John C. Ford, S.J., of
Weston College and Boston College. Two are distinguished publicists,
George E. Sokolsky and Felix Morley.
In this convocation the Natural Law Institute leaves the realm of
the philosophy and history of the Natural Law, in the salty phrases
of Judge Hutcheson 2 "to get down to cases by talking about natural
rights as realities, about, in short, words become flesh and dwelling

among us. . .

."

The theme is the relationship of the Natural Law to

the rights which are fundamental to Americans - the right to liberty,
to property, to freedom of expression, and to pursue happiness.
It would indeed be carrying coals to Newcastle for this reviewer
to state the meaning or historical importance of the Natural Law.
There has been no more eloquent expositor of that in our time than
Professor Barrett, editor of this volume, and he has once more stated
it in his introduction. Nor can I in this space rephrase the substance
of these notable papers. This volume is small, easy to read, and its
authors are well able to speak for themselves.
The first duty of a book reviewer, it seems to me, is to make clear
to the reader of the review the specific usefulness to him of the book
in question. Is it a book that he should read and if so, for what
purpose - for general background information, for moral and religious
inspiration, or for immediate usefulness in his daily work? I can provide a personal answer to this by stating how I found the preceding
volumes of this series serviceable. I was compelled on short notice
this spring to go to Phoenix, Arizona, to deliver a lecture-sermon at a
Sunday service. My subject, which I selected for myself, was "The
Right Above the Law." There was little time to prepare. About all
that I could depend upon was my own education in jurisprudence and
political science and whatever reading and note-taking I could do
during a ten-hour plane ride. The three little red books answered my
1 Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.

2 Text at 48.
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need. For in them was deduced by the fine minds of the authors of
the papers an abundant store of the wisdom of the ages. They were
better for me than a library.
This present book can do that for one who seeks the basic theses of
the political faith that Americans live by. Placed side by side with
its three predecessors, it rounds out a fine summation of fundamentals.
It is the sort of book that brings to us the sobering feeling that we are
heirs to a great tradition and that it is our moral obligation to preserve
that heritage and to pass it on unscathed.
Mr. Sokolsky seeks in his paper to determine the source of human
rights. With rare and original insight he makes the point that surely
our basic principles of living must be eternal, because as we move back
through the centuries to materially smaller and simpler civilizations
we find more and more clear and forceful affirmations of truth. He
says: 3 "How does it happen that little Palestine and Syria and Greece
understood so much and we so little? Is it possible or believable that
in the realm of human relations all that needs to be known has forever
been known?"
The answer to Mr. Sokolsky's question must be affirmative and,
that being true, can any rational being deny the ultimate divine
source of these precepts?
It is well that Judge Hutcheson has presented here and now his
views on the inseparability of the right of property from the other
rights guaranteed to Americans. It is well because in our Supreme
Court in these recent years there has been a tendency to erect a
hierarchy of rights, with that of property lowest in rank. It is well for
Judge Hutcheson to deny this because, except for a determination
by a president to appoint no one but those who agreed with him,
this great Texas jurist would now be gracing our highest tribunal.
In his paper, with a wealth of scholarship he proves that those who
created our institutions asserted as a matter of course 4 "that a man
would be no better than a slave if he could not exercise his natural
right to acquire and own property and to retain it free from arbitrary
control.... "
No one who is familiar with recent efforts of jurists and scholars
to turn back the tide of positivism, pragmatism and futilitarianism in
our law can fail to give high place to the contribution of Father
John C. Ford. It suffices to add that his discussion, "The Natural Law
and the Right to Pursue Happiness," is up to his rigorous high
standard.
Id. at 14.
4 Id. at 67.
3
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These papers and the ones that preceded them in the convocations
of the Institute become powerful tracts in a growing new conservatism in America. I am bold to say that we are witnessing another
renaissance in thought, based, as was the former one, on a rediscovery
of the past. A nation almost blinded and partially drugged by false
philosophy and treacherous politics may yet find its way through the
inspiration of Natural Law.
Raymond Moley*

TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS:

A Story of the Antitrust Laws.

By Harold Fleming.' New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951. Pp. xiv,
206. $2.25. - Mr. Fleming pulls no punches in this indictment of
current uncertainty, contradiction and confusion in antitrust law. He
writes with vigor and supports his contentions with full citations to
cases and source materials. Portions of the book previously appeared
in the Harvard Business Review, Harper's Monthly, and in the Christian Science Monitor of which Mr. Fleming is business reporter.
Although the book was written "for the layman rather than the
lawyer," it will be read with profit by lawyers, particularly by those
whose busy practice in other fields leaves less time for keeping posted
on antitrust law developments. This reviewer strongly recommends
"Ten Thousand Commandments" to law students in connection with
courses in Administrative Law, Trade Regulation and Constitutional
Law.
According to Mr. Justice Douglas, "Philosophers of the democratic
faith will rejoice in the uncertainty of the law and find strength and
glory in it." 2 American businessmen, however, can hardly be expected
to rejoice when prosecuted tomorrow for what they have done today
in good faith reliance upon yesterday's administrative rulings or
judicial decisions. Indeed, President Wilson urged the enactment of
the Federal Trade Commission Act precisely because business needs
"more explicit legislative definition of the policy and meaning of the
existing antitrust law" and because "Nothing hampers business like
uncertainty . . . or discourages it like the necessity to take chances,
to run the risk of falling under the condemnation of the law before it
can make sure just what the law is." 3 The "Rule of Law" should at
* Professor of Public Law, Columbia University; Contributing Editor,
Newsweek.
1 Business reporter, the Christian Science Monitor.
2 Address before the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar
Association; quoted, text at 21.
3 Message to the joint Session of Congress, January 20, 1914; quoted,
text at 23.
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least mean that government will be bound by rules established in
advance which its administrators will not change with retroactive
effect, to the injury of men who have bona fide planned their affairs
in conformity with those rules. Otherwise the current admonition of
the bar to the layman "See Your Lawyer First" is a species of
deception.
Antitrust law administrators seem reluctant, however, to develop
a set of standards by which a businessman would know whether he
was violating the antitrust laws. 4 It seems from the statements of
ex-Attorney General McGrath and House Judiciary Committee Chairman Celler, as quoted by Mr. Fleming, 5 that if antitrust law violations were codified or specifically enumerated, "the process would
become a rat-race between the monopolist seizing upon omissions and
the Congress trying to fill them into the law, always eighteen steps
behind. . . ." The same issue was presented in England three hundred
years ago on another occasion - "whether the Crown should be
governed by specific rules of law or should be free-wheeling in its
actions." 6 The issue was resolved in favor of the "Rule of Law." We
have thought that resoluti6n final for free government. Keeping the
law "fluid" or "dynamic" (sometimes mere euphemisms for "uncertain") may be too high a price to pay for reducing the "time-lag"
apparently inevitable in legislation by human beings.
Mr. Fleming thinks the courts as well as administrative agencies
have helped to create this pattern of uncertainty. From 1937 to 1949
the Supreme Court reversed 30 earlier decisions. The author quotes
Mr. Justice Roberts' warning: 7
It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt and confusion ...
this Court, which has been looked to as exhibiting consistency . . . should

now itself become the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in-the public
mind. . . .With these frequent reversals . . . the law becomes not a
charge to govern conduct, but a game of chance ... instead of settling
rights and liabilities, it unsettles them....
Not all these reversals were antitrust cases, but the "dynamism"
they reflect could not but influence lower courts and give a new
look to administrative determinations. Between 1946 and mid-1949
the Supreme Court rendered 86 five-to-four decisions. Seemingly this
unprecedented increase in "five-to-fours" may be due, in no small
measure, to the ever-broadening judicial invasion of the legislative
or policy-making function hitherto conceived as reserved to the Congress. Not only has there been judicial legislation in filling manifest
gaps left in statutes, but even where the Congress has not legislated
Text at 22.
5 Rep. Celler, Proceedings of Symposium, Section. on Antitrust Law, New
4

York State Bar Association, January 25, 1950; quoted, text at 22.

6 Text at 24.
7 Quoted, Id. at 20.
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at all. Thus, in the Cement Institute case, 8 the Supreme Court apparrently ruled out the "basing point system," although the lower court
showed that over the years the Congress had repeatedly refused to
declare it illegal.
From uncertainty stem contradiction and confusion. Mr. Fleming
is ready with "chapter and verse." A few examples must suffice here.
The Morton Salt Co. case 9 suggests that the law is violated by "the
possibility" that price discriminations "may have the effect" of harming competition, without actual proof that they have done so. Mr.
justice Jackson vainly protested in dissent that "the law rarely
authorizes judgments on proof of mere possibilities." The same case
apparently requires "functional pricing" although the Robinson-Patman Act involved did not. Re-sale price maintenance had been condemned by the Supreme Court and by FTC.1O Yet we have a ruling
by the FTC more recently which practically compels a large oil
company to enforce the practice on certain of its jobber-retailers. 11
In 1948, Senator Capehart in the course of Senate hearings asked
FTC's "six top lawyers" about two proposed selling methods condemned by the Court and FTC. They said "so far as they knew they
were all right." 12 Again, one Federal Trade Commissioner states in an
interview "Freight absorption is out the window" and another de'clares that freight absorption "is not out the window." 13 In the antitrust field, the schoolboy conundrum "How Big is Big?" has a new
version - "How Big is Too Big?" Mr. Fleming in this connection
discusses the extent to which the new doctrine of "Opportunity for
Abuse" is gaining upon the well established holding that "mere size
is not outlawed." 14 If size alone raises the presumption of the existence of power or capacity to restrain competition, it is an easy step
to hold that the existence of a capacity to do what the law forbids
is itself a violation of the law. As Mr. Fleming says, "Any firm with
any kind of economic power is now, off-hand, in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act." 15 This is equivalent to saying that "The
power to commit grand larceny may itself constitute an evil and
stand condemned even though it remains unexercised." 16
8 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S. Ct. 793, 92 L. Ed. 1010
(1948).
9 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 68 S. Ct. 822, 92 L. Ed. 1196 (1948).
10

Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 60 S. Ct. 618, 84

L. Ed. 852 (1940). In the Matter of Middle Atlantic Distributors, Inc., FTC
Docket No. 5634.
21 See affirmance of FTC order in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F. (2d)
210 (7th Cir. 1949).
12 Quoted, text at 19.

13 Ibid.
14 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 40 S. Ct. 293,
64 L. Ed. 343 (1920).
15

Text at 66.

16 Ibid.
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To the tendency of the courts to abdicate in favor of the administrator's expertise and accept the findings of administrative bodies as
conclusive - in other words "to take the government's lawyer's word
for it"; to the indecision of the law enforcers with regard to business
integration, whether vertical or horizontal; to the dubious practices
of government lawyers in antitrust cases ("as far as business and the
Sherman Antitrust Act are concerned, the Department of Justice has
practically riddled the Bill of Rights." 17); to these and many more
alarming phases of antitrust law development, Mr. Fleming pays his
strongly-worded but well-documented respects. If some think he
presents "only one side" - and students of public law know well
that there are at least "two sides" when enforcement of broadly
worded policy-statutes like Antitrust laws are involved - it might be
said that it is high time laymen as well as lawyers heard a clear,
non-technical and forthright expression of the dangers of excessive
enthusiasm in antitrust law interpretation and enforcement. Mr.
Fleming's job was to state "what is." He leaves "what should be" to
others. He quotes Federal Trade Commissioner Mason: is
What a young law student needs most after a diploma and a
shingle and a client is a good pair of eyebrows and broad shoulders.
Then when his client asks him how to stay out of trouble with the

government, he can raise the first and shrug the second....
If we [the FTC] had the money we could get a "cease-and-desist"
order against every businessman in the United States who is engaged in
interstate commerce. The businessman has nothing to say. He can only
hope the law of averages will keep him off the wrong end of a complaint.

Small wonder! Mr. Fleming lists attacks by the courts, by administrative agencies and by the Congress on no less than 18 different
aspects of American business and concludes: 19
It is hard to see how any firm of importance in America can fail to
be guilty of violating some, if not most, of these canons or interpretations. In other words, if these things are all wrong, American business
is all wrong and can be made right by nothing short of utter tear-down
and re-assembly along totally different lines.

He suggests in his chapter "Arm Chair Economics" an interesting
ideological ancestry for the attack on American business. It has been
noted that nothing is more embarrassing than the genealogy of ideas.
Thorstein Veblen, who "did not know anything about American business except what he had read. .

.

. But he didn't like it, any more

than he seems to have liked expensively dressed women or college
faculty boards ....," 20 has bequeathed not only his vocabulary but his
bitter animus against American business to a very industrious progeny.
17

Id. at 171.

18

Id. at 20, 7.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 180-1.

19
20
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Alongside the "Folklore of Capitalism" we now have the "Folklore
of Trust-Busting."
It is a "fixed cost" of American democracy that the demagogue
and the doctrinaire have leave to speak on the relation which should
exist between government and business based on free enterprise.
Democracy also permits other voices to be heard. With two of these
Mr. Fleming concludes. One is from a United States Senator seventy
years ago. The other is from the Governor of a great state twenty
years ago. Said the Senator: 21
I do not dread these corporations as instruments of power to destroy
this country, because there are thousands of agencies which can regulate,
restrain and control them. But there is a corporation we may all dread.
That corporation is the Federal Government. From the aggression of this
corporation there can be no safety if it is allowed to go beyond the
well-defined limits of its power. I dread nothing so much as the exercise
of ungranted and doubtful powers by this Government ...

Said the Governor:

22

Were it possible to find master minds so unselfish, so willing to
decide unhesitatingly against their own personal interests or private
prejudices, men almost God-like in their ability to hold the scales of
justice with an even hand, such a government might be to the interests
of the country. But there are none such on our political horizon, and
we cannot expect a complete reversal of all the teachings of history.

The Senator was David B. Hill, Democrat from New York. The
Governor was Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Edward F. Barrett*

TE. ALERICAN GoVERNMENT AND ITS WORK. By Edward W.
Carter 1 and Charles C. Rohlfing. 2 New York City: The Macmillan
Company, 1952. Pp. xv, 875. $6.00. - This book in reality is the
fifth edition of a book first published in 1915. The title of the
original book was "The New American Government and Its Work."
It was written by James T. Young. Dr. Young is Professor of
Public Administration at the Wharton School of Finance and Com21
22

*

Quoted, id. at 195.
Quoted, id. at 196.
Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.

1 Associate Professor of Political Science, Wharton School of Finance and
Commerce, University of Pennsylvania.
2 Professor of Political Science, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce,
University of Pennsylvania.
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merce of the University of Pennsylvania and is an outstanding
authority in this field. His book was an immediate and permanent
success and it was reissued in a second, third and fourth edition in
1923, 1933 and 1940 respectively.
The present volume is issued under the names of Edward W.
Carter and Charles C. Rohlfing, both being members of the faculty
of the University of Pennsylvania, but it is based on Dr. Young's
earlier book. Dr. Young himself assisted extensively in the preparation of the present book. The present text in many, if not most,
instances continues to use the phraseology of the fourth edition,
with necessary alterations to reflect the changes in the world since
1940.
In examining the present and earlier editions of this notable
book, the reader is struck by the impartiality with which are presented various aspects of controversial problems. Dr. Young was not
and is not a special pleader who tries to distort facts in order to
maintain a predetermined position. He and the authors of the
present book have set forth an objective picture of the way in which
American government functions in all of its branches. Naturally
most of the book deals with government on the national level, but
government on the state and local levels is fully treated.
At the time when the fourth edition was written, the Second
World War was being fought, but the United States was not yet a
belligerent. The tremendous changes, both of an international and a
domestic nature, which were caused by this war have been adequately and accurately treated. Good examples of such treatment
are to be found in the discussion of federal fiscal policies, 3 and the
chapters devoted to foreign relations 4 and to war.5 Similarly, where
changes in national policy or the machinery of government have
been less spectacular since they were caused by forces already
operating or were the result of legislative or executive policies in
existence before the war, the present book is entirely adequate and
usually admirable in its discussion of them. As an example, one may
cite the treatment of the slow but ever increasing
growth of govern6
ment regulation over business and industry.
More than one of the persons who reviewed earlier editions of
this book commented upon the large extent to which the author
relied upon judicial decisions and the "legal approach" by which he
reached his conclusions. Indeed, one reviewer felt that this was
3

Text at 396 et seq.
Id. at 325 et seq.
5 Id. at 359 et seq.
6 See The Trend Toward Concentration, id. at 1 et seq. and the chapters
entitled Trade Regulations, id. at 482, and Labor, id. at 527.
4
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overdone, 7 which of course was nonsense, since a book about government must necessarily be a book about law. I cannot find that Dr.
Young, Dr. Carter or Dr. Rohlfing was ever formally bred to the
law. Nevertheless they write as if they were members of the bar.
In the words of the great Bull Warren, of the Harvard Law School,
they "make a noise like lawyers." If there is to be any adverse
criticism of the book, it could only be directed to the fact that the
college undergraduates for whom it is intended probably will miss
some of its nuances since they are not lawyers. One is reminded
in this instance of what Oscar Wilde said about youth, "Youth is a
wonderful thing. It is a pity that it has to be wasted on persons
who are too young to appreciate it." Only a lawyer who has the
academic background of his profession can appreciate fully the legal
flavor of much of this book. To such a reader let me commend it.
He will not regret the time spent in reading it, but on the contrary
will derive from it both information and pleasure.
Daniel J.McKenna*
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CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS.

7

Rankin, Book Review, 34 Am. PoL. Scr. REv. 1036, 1037 (1940).

* Dean of the School of Law, University of Detroit.
*-Reviewed

in this issue.
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